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STATEl\fENT OF THE CASE

is an appeal

an

Commissioners R. D. Maynard , Chairman, and Thomas E. Limbaugh, and the Honorable
Douglas A. Donohue , Referee with the Idaho Industrial Commiss ion, concludin g that
Claimant is not entitled to medical care benefits after August 9, 2007, the date she was
determined by the Referee to be her date of medical stability, related to her October 30,
2005, industrial accident and injury.
The backgrou nd of this case can be taken partially from page 2 of the Referee's
Findings of Fact, Conclusi ons of Law and Recomme ndation (hereinafter "Decision").
The parties agree that Claimant/Appellant, Channel (Blacker) Rish, (hereinafter
"Claimant") suffered a compensa ble accident at work on October 30, 2005.
On the above accident date, Claimant slipped on a floor mat and twisted her right
knee. At page

of the Referee's Decision, paragraph 128, the Referee conclude d:

"She suffered, at most, a minor sprain. However, extensive medical treatment ,
including three arthrosco pic surgeries and several injections have produced a harmful
result. Medical opinions persuasiv ely suggest that some pain may be the result of
scarring from the surgeries. "
The Referee conclude d that the Claimant reached MMI as of August 9, 2007,
when Dr. Casey Huntsma n, who had performe d all three arthroscopic surgeries , opined
Claimant to be at MMI. (See Decision, par. 104) At paragraph 107 of the Decision , the
Referee stated, "The preponde rance of evidence shows physician s who treated Claimant
after August 9, 2007, merely provided, at best, palliative treatment which subjectively,
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decreased Claiman t's complaints of pain but did not provide any
measures or restore

a measureable
and

9, 2007, as being "reasona ble."
Dr. Huntsm an's chart note for August 9, 2007, states, under the heading
"RECO MMEND ATION S": "I discussed the diagnosis with the patient. We discussed
treatment options. She definitely needs to see Dr. Zoe for continued pain management.
I
do believe from my standpo int she has reached maximu m medical improve ment."
(emphasis added)
Claiman t contends that the Commis sion's decision to cut off any and all of
Claiman t's medical treatment subsequent to August 9, 2007, was unreasonable and is
not
based on substantial and compete nt evidence. Additionally, the Commis sion misappl
ied
the law in deciding whether or not Claiman t's medical treatment after August 7, 2009,
was reasonable.
2.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition:

On Februar y 26,2010 , Claiman t filed a complaint with the Industrial
Commission. The matter went to hearing, which was held on August 26, 2014. The
Commission's Decisio n was issued on Septemb er 23, 2105. This appeal followed.
3.

Stateme nt of Facts:

As stated above, it is undisputed that, on October 30, 2005, the Claiman t suffered
a compensable acciden t at work as a clerk at The Home Depot. At that time the Claiman
t
slipped on a floor mat and twisted her right knee. Claiman t does not dispute the
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Referee's finding expressed at page 32

at

the Decision, paragraph 128, where the Referee

a

including three arthroscopic surgeries and several injections have produced a harmful
result. Medical opinions persuasively suggest that some pain may be the result of
scarring from the surgeries. "
As stated above, on August 9, 2007, three months after her last right knee
arthroscopy with lateral release, her treating physician and surgeon, Dr. Casey Huntsman,
declared her to be at MMI. Despite the fact that Claimant was at MMI, Dr. Huntsman
declared, "She definitely needs to see Dr. Zoe for continued pain management." (See
Claimant's Exhibit #3, page 23)
By letter to the Surety dated October 4, 2007, Dr. Huntsman stated:
"I am writing this letter to let you know where I am at concerning Channel
Rish and her right knee problem. She is now 4 Yz months out from her
lateral release. She really does not feel like it has helped. She has seen
Dr. Zoe who is working on some pain management issues which I think
would be helpful for her. At this point in time, I recommend an
independent medical evaluation to determine what her true functional
status should be. I believe she is definitely in pain but there is nothing
mechanical that can be done surgically to make this better. I have told
her I do not think any further surgery is needed and she needs to continue
working on pain coping and pain management issues. Please contact me
if you have any questions or concerns about her situation." (Claimant's
Exhibit 3, p. 25, emphasis added)

In his chart note of that day - October 4, 2007 - Dr. Huntsman stated:
"I am glad she has pursued treatment with Dr. Zoe. Dr. Zoe is looking at
all her options. At this point in time, I think it would be good for her to
have an independent medical evaluation to determine what her functional
status should be at this point. She definitely needs continued pain
management. I definitely do not think any more surgery would be
beneficial for
" (Claimant's Exhibit 3, 26, emphasis added)
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Although she subsequently was seen by several IME and
at

1

was in the best position to evaluate the Claimant at the most relevant times. He
had performed the surgeries and actually observed Claimant's internal knee
condition. His opinion that Claimant was at MMI as of August 9, 2007, carries
the most weight"
Obviously the question is, if the Commission relies most heavily on Dr.
Huntsman's opinions, why is no treatment after August 9, 2007, approved, even
though Dr. Huntsman unequivocally prescribes follow up pain management?
At paragraph 112, the Decision states, "Considering the totality of facts
and circumstances, Claimant's condition, related to the 2005 industrial accident
reached MMI as of August 7, 2007. Medical care benefits thereafter were merely
palliative and failed to restore function to any useful degree."
As such, the Commission ordered that any medical benefits provided
Claimant after August 7, 2007, were unreasonable.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. DID THE COMMISSION APPLY THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD
TO DETERMINE "REASONABLENESS" OF CLAIMANT'S
MEDICAL TREATMENT AFTER AUGUST 7, 2007?

ATTOR NEY FEES ON APPEAL

Attorney's fees are requested per LC. §72-804.
Ill
Ill
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LEGAL SUMM ARY

is to
are to

Loving

and 1'.J.ore Inc. 133 Idaho 572, 573, 990 P.2d 738 (citations omitted). The human
e

purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical construction. Ogden
v.
Thompson, 128 Idaho 87,910 P.2d 759 (1996).

The Act is to be construed broadly to

bring as many workers within its coverage as possible and the Act should be constru
ed
liberally in order to effectuate its beneficent purposes. Yount v. Bounda ry County
, 118
Idaho 307, 796 P.2d 516 (1990).
When reviewing a decision by the Industrial Commission, the Court exercises
free
review over the Commission's conclusions of law, but will not disturb the Commi
ssion's
factual findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence.
LC. §72732; Stewart v. Sun Valley Co., 140 Idaho 381, 384, 94 P.3d 686, 689 (2004).
Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might
accept to support a conclusion." Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State Ins. Fund,
128
Idaho 161, 164, 911 P.2d 754, 757 (1996).
LC. §72-432(1) provides that an employer must provide for an injured employ
ee
such reasonable medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and
hospital
services, medicines, crutches and apparatus, as may be reasonably required by
the
employee's physician or needed immediately after an injury or manifestation

of an

occupational disease, and for a reasonable time thereafter.
LC. §72-432(1) obligates the employer to provide treatment, if the employ ee's
physician requires the treatment and if the treatment is reasonable. It is for the
physician,
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not the Commission, to decide whether the treatment is required. The only review the
IS

treatment was

An employer must pay
required by the physician, period. [It] does not require that the claimant make gradual
improvement from the treatment received. Whether the claimant's condition gradually
improved should not be determinative of whether treatment is reasonable. Certainly it is
conceivable that a course of treatment seemed necessary at the time the doctor prescribed
it, even though a patient unfortunately did not improve. The reasonableness of a doctor's
determination that treatment is indicated should be measured at the time the doctor
prescribes treatment, not by "armchair doctoring" afterwards with the benefit of
hindsight. Chavez v. Stokes, 353 P.3d 414 (Idaho) (2015), approvingly quoting Justice
Bistline's specially concurring and dissenting opinion from Hipwell v. Challenger Pallet
& Supply, 124 Idaho 294, 859 P.2d 330 (1993).

Once a claimant is medically stable, he or she is no longer in a period of recovery,
and total temporary disability benefits cease. Jarvis v. Rexburg Nursing Center, 136
Idaho 579,586, 38 P.3d 617, 624 (2001).

ARGUMENT
Claimant contends the Commission's Decision is not supported by substantial and
competent evidence and the Referee used the wrong legal standard in deciding that
Claimant's medical care after August 9, 2007, was not reasonable, necessary or related to
Claimant's industrial accident on October 30, 2005.

Ill
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1.

As to medical care benefits, that Claimant attained MMI on August 9,
2007, is irrelevant

on
date Dr. Casey Huntsman deemed her at MMI and awarded her a PPI rating.
Although MMI stops the "period of recovery" which ends a claimant's right to
disability income benefits, it is irrelevant as to a claimant's right to medical care benefits.
LC. §72-432(1) requires an employer to pay medical benefits immediately after an injury
and "for a reasonable time thereafter."
That the Commission chose to deny benefits from that date forward is not
supported by substantial or competent evidence.
2. The Commission applied the wrong legal standard to determine
"reasonableness" of Claimant's medical treatment after August 9, 2007.

As stated above, it is worth repeating that the Referee stated, at paragraph 108 of
the Decision, "Dr. Huntsman was in the best position to evaluate the Claimant at the most
relevant times. He had performed the surgeries and actually observed Claimant's internal
knee condition. His opinion that Claimant was at MMI as of August 9, 2007, carries the
most weight"
Dr. Huntsman also saw the Claimant on October 4, 2007, for a post-surgery
assessment - after the Referee concluded that no additional medical benefits should be
awarded the Claimant. Dr. Huntsman commented, "She definitely needs continued pain
management." (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 26) There are no opposing medical opinions
that this visit was not reasonable, necessary and related to Claimant's right knee injury.
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Dr. Huntsman last saw the Claimant on November 29, 2007. He noted
~,u,uu~u•

was not
at

the

from
Utah,

All of Claimant's treating physicians clearly agree that she suffered from chronic
knee pain subsequent to her accident at Home Depot. These include Dr. Huntsman, Dr.
Zoe, Dr. Christensen, Dr. Bender, and Dr. Poston.
Paragraph 112 of the Decision states:
"Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, Claimant's condition, related
to the 2005 industrial accident reached MMI as of August 7[sic], 2007. Medical care
benefits thereafter were merely palliative and failed to restore function to any useful
degree." (emphasis added)
In paragraph 111, the Commission states: "Moreover, a significant amount of Dr.
Poston's treatment included a spinal stimulator. The preponderance of evidence shows it
failed to restore function in any objective way." (emphasis added)
In paragraph 106, the Referee wTites: "The preponderance of evidence fails to
show an improvement in Claimant's condition between the dates of the two IME
evaluations." (emphasis added)
In paragraph 107, the Commission states: "The preponderance of evidence shows
physicians who treated Claimant after August 9, 2007, merely provided, at best, palliative
treatment which subjectively, temporarily, decreased Claimant's complaints of pain but
did not provide any curative measures or restore function in any measureable way."
(emphasis added)
In his Decision, paragraph 103, the Referee states:
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"One factor among

in determining whether post-recovery palliative care

1S

treatment
Clearly the sole standard relied on by the Commission to decide the
"reasonableness" of the Claimant's medical treatment after her injury was whether or not,
with the benefit of hindsight, the treatment restored function.
This misstates the most current law regarding "reasonableness" of treatment. It is
worth repeating from the Chavez case, above, where Justice Bistline described the
"appropriate view" of Sprague and the "reasonableness inquiry of Idaho Code section 72432(1)." He said:
"Whether the claimant's condition gradually improved should not
be determinative of whether treatment is reasonable. Certainly it is
conceivable that a course of treatment seemed necessary at the time the
doctor prescribed it, even though a patient unfortunately did not improve.
The reasonableness of a doctor's determination that treatment is indicated
should be measured at the time the doctor prescribes treatment, not by
"armchair doctoring" afterwards with the benefit of hindsight."

The IME doctors also agree that the Claimant suffered from chronic knee pain
(mostly) secondary to the Home Depot accident.
In his IME on January 9, 2008, Dr. Gussner opined, on page 6 of his report, that
Claimant should undergo an evaluation by Dr. Burks at the University of Utah, just like
Dr. Huntsman recommended. (See Joint Exhibit "L" bate stamped page #00294)
Without any medical advice to the contrary, the surety denied this referral.
In his IME on January 10, 2008, Dr. Friedman opined that the Claimant suffered "an
exacerbation of an [sic] preexisting condition based on the I 0/30/05 injury and its
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subsequent treatment"

He further stated,

be placed

an

a

would

patient to maximize her function, treat

depression, and provide substantial documentation regarding her ability to return to work
at her previous employment." (Joint Exhibit "L" bate stamped page 00301) At Joint
Exhibit "L" bate stamped 00314, in a letter to the Surety dated February 07, 2008, Dr.
Gussner clearly opined that he believed the Life Fit Chronic Pain program he
recommended was due to the industrial accident, stating it was "due to surgical
interventions for industrial injury."
Without any medical opinion to the contrary, the Surety denied the second opinion
with Dr. Burks which the doctors unanimously agreed on, and the Claimant was unable to
attend the Life Fit Chronic Pain Management Program prescribed by Drs. Gussner and
Friedman because the Surety refused to pay for day care for her children while she was
gone. (H.T. p. 58, 1. 13, top. 59, I. 19)2
With the knowledge and consent of the Surety, the Claimant continued to treat with
Dr. Zoe primarily with opioid medications including Fentanyl and Lortab. (Claimant's
Exhibit 6)
1

Drs. Friedman and Gussner attempt to relate or apportion some of Claimant's chronic right knee pain to a
preexisting condition based on remote medical records from Dr. Kay Christensen, Claimant's family
physician from three doctor visits in 1994, 1995, and 1997, when she was only 15, 16 and 18 years old.
There are no records of pre-existing right knee pain for at least 8 years prior to the October 20, 2005,
industrial accident. The Referee recognized this and discounted the apportionment of the injury to prior
years in paragraph 128 of the Decision, where he states as a finding of fact, "She suffered, at most, a minor
sprain. However, extensive medical treatment, including three arthroscopic surgeries and several injections
have produced a harmful result."
2
In his Decision, par. 105, the Referee misunderstood the facts regarding the referral to Dr. Burks by Drs.
Huntsman, Gussman and Friedman, and the Life Fit Program. The Referee concluded that the Claimant
never saw Dr. Burks because of"insurmountable personal issues." This is not correct. The record is clear
that the Claimant wanted to see Dr. Burks. The reason the Claimant never saw Dr. Burks was because the
Surety denied it. Claimant was unable to attend the recommended Life Fit program because the Surety
refused to pay for daycare and the Claimant could not leave her children for three weeks. (See H.T. p. 58,
l.13,top.59,1.19)
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Nearly a year later, on January 28, 2009, Claimant was again IME'd by Dr. Gussner.

at least to

8, 1

addressed

"probable right knee strain related to work injury of 10/30/2005." Other than
recommending the Claimant tapering off and discontinuing opioid medications, Dr.
Gussner had no other treatment recommendations at that time related to the 10/30/2005
accident. (Joint Exhibit "L" bate stamped 00313)
At about the same time, i.e., January 28, 2009, at the request of the Surety, Claimant
underwent a psychological evaluation with a Dr. Michael H. McClay, in Boise, as part of
the Gussner physical IME. Interestingly, Dr. McClay found Claimant to be suffering
from "the elements of a Chronic Pain Syndrome" but stated, "The patient needs to be out
of the worker's compensation process as quickly as possible." (Joint Exhibit "M" bate
stamped 00318)
In April of 2009, the Surety cut off medical benefits to the Claimant. (H.T. p. 63, 11.
5-6.
The Claimant's treatments with Dr. Zoe abruptly ended May 1, of 2009, when her
medical benefits were cut off.
Thereafter Claimant was left to treat her painful symptoms on her own. (H. T. p. 61,
11. 22-25) Nearly five months later, on September 8, 2009, the Claimant was seen by her
family doctor, Dr. Kay Christensen, for right knee pain. (Claimant's Exhibit 2, p. 8) Dr.
Christensen diagnosed her as suffering from chronic knee pain, secondary to her
industrial accident in 2005. In June of 2010, Dr. Christensen referred the Claimant to Dr.
Joseph Liljenquist, who first saw her in July of 2010. (Claimant's Exhibit 9, p. 1) Dr.
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Liljenquist, an orthopedic surgeon, diagnosed Claimant as suffering from a non-surgical
to

Jason

to
Dr. Poston.
On February 24, 2014, the Claimant submitted to another IME for the Surety when
she was seen by Dr. Gary Walker. (Joint Exhibit N) Dr. Walker physically examined the
Claimant and reviewed all of her medical records. To summarize, Dr. Walker concluded
that "Her diagnosis is chronic right knee pain complaints following a work injury of
10/30/2005. She does have a history of remote knee problems dating back to 1994.
However, she has no interval history of problems for the following 11 years." (Joint
Exhibit "N" bate stamped #00334) He further opined, "Her work injury on 10/30/2005
resulted in a medial knee irtjury." At page 00335, he states, "There does seem to be a
causal relationship between her 2005 injury and her current ongoing problems."
Although he opined on page 00336 that the spinal cord stimulator was not very
helpful, he expressly declared during his deposition that Dr. Poston's prescribing a spinal
cord stimulator was reasonable. Dr. Walker stated, "Based on his statement on that one
note of his exam findings and doing a trial and her getting some positive response of a
trial, it seems at the time it was maybe a reasonable thing to do." (Deposition of Gary
Walker, p. 44, 11. 8-11)
The doctors are unanimous that the Claimant suffered from chronic right knee pain to
one degree or another as a result of her industrial accident and subsequent surgeries.
With the benefit of hindsight, the Claimant's treatment over the years with narcotic
medication management and even the spinal cord stimulator, was not particularly curative
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or permanently beneficial. However, that is not the standard to be used to determine if
treatment

As Justice Bistline wrote:
"LC. §72-432(1) obligates the employer to provide treatment, if the
employee's physician requires the treatment and if the treatment is
reasonable. It is for the physician, not the Commission, to decide whether
the treatment is required. The only review the Commission is entitled to
make of the physician's decision is whether the treatment was reasonable.
An employer must pay for the costs of reasonable medical treatment
required by the physician, period. [It] does not require that the claimant
make gradual improvement from the treatment received. Whether the
claimant's condition gradually improved should not be determinative of
whether treatment is reasonable. Certainly it is conceivable that a course
of treatment seemed necessary at the time the doctor prescribed it, even
though a patient unfortunately did not improve. The reasonableness of a
doctor's determination that treatment is indicated should be measured at
the time the doctor prescribes treatment, not by "armchair doctoring"
afterwards with the benefit of hindsight."

The Commission clearly judged the reasonableness of this Claimant's treatment by.
the standard of whether or not, with the benefit of hindsight, the Claimant gradually
improved, not as to whether or not it was reasonable under the circumstances at the time
the physician prescribed it.
Dr. Walker said it best in his deposition with respect to the prescribed spine
stimulator when he opined, "Based on his statement on that one note of his exam findings
and doing a trial and her getting some positive response of a trial, it seems at the time it
was maybe a reasonable thing to do." In other words, at the time he prescribed the spine
stimulator, based on what he observed, it was reasonable treatment under the
circumstances, regardless of whether or not the treatment was ultimately successful.

Ill
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ATTORNE Y'S
event
or

to an

employee.

case

clearly medical benefits were unreasonably denied to one degree or another. This is best
exemplified with respect to the referral of the Claimant by Dr. Huntsman to Dr. Burks at
the University of Utah. Drs. Gussman and Friedman concurred in the referral, but the
exam was denied by the surety with no supporting medical opinion.
Claimant contends her medical care has been unreasonably denied and she should
be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee in the event she is the prevailing party.

CONCLUS ION
In deciding that Claimant's medical treatment in this case was reasonable, the
Commission wrongfully substituted its opinion in the place of the Claimant's treating
physicians and the medical professionals. Instead of evaluating whether the treatment
was reasonable at the time of treatment, given the Claimants presentatio n and symptoms
at that time, the Commissio n looked to whether or not, with the benefit of hindsight, the
treatment was successful - or "restored function."
Chronic pain (and arguably Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome or CRPS as several
doctors diagnosed the Claimant as suffering from) is difficult to diagnose and treat. Not
all treatments are successful. However, looking at this case from the physicians point of
view, at the time of treatment and without "armchair doctoring" the Claimant's
prescribed medical care was clearly reasonable.
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The Commission relied on the

standard to come to

Respectfully,

y

~r

{___----

PAUL T. CURTIS
Attorney for Claimant/ Appellant
Channel (Blacker) Rish
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Certificate of Service

I

on

16, two

the foregoing APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF were served upon the following
attorneys of record by the method indicated:

W. Scott Wigle
P.O Box 1007
Boise, ID 83701

[ )(]US Mail, postage pre-paid

[ J Hand Delivery
[ J Facsimile
[ J Overnight Mail

Paul T. Curtis
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